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Essays
The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law
Omri Ben-Shahare and Lisa Bernstein"
A long and distinguished line of law-and-economics articles has
established that in many circumstances fully compensatory expectation
damages are a desirable remedy for breach of contract because they induce
both efficient performance and efficient breach.' The expectation measure,
which seeks to put the breached-against party in the position she would
have been in had the contract been performed, has, therefore, rightly been
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1. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Contracts, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 436, 439 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Shavcll. Contracts]
(" Higher damages than the expectation measure might induce performance when it is inefficient.
and lower damages might induce breach when that is inefficient."). The expectation measure has,
however, been shown to provide inefficient reliance incentives. For the seminal article refining the
circumstances in which expectation damages are desirable, see Steven Shavell. Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980). For a general discussion of and
bibliographies on the economic analysis of damages, see Aaron S. Edlin. Breach Remedies, in I
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra, at 174: and Paul
Mahoney, Contract Remedies: General, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn
Bouckhaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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chosen as the dominant contract default rule. It does a far better job of
regulating breach-or-perform incentives than its leading competitors-the
restitution measure, the reliance measure, and specific performance.
This Essay does not directly take issue with the economic literature
demonstrating the general desirability of expectation damages. Rather, it
suggests that the literature is implicitly based on the assumption that it is
costless for the breached-against party to reveal the information necessary
to establish the magnitude of expectation damages. It then argues that in
real-world transactional contexts characterized by asymmetric information
and the availability of broad pretrial discovery rights, the expectation
measure may not be as desirable a remedy as the existing literature
suggests.
The core intuition that this Essay develops is simple. When a breach
occurs and expectation damages are sought, the expectation measure will
often include lost profit. Lost profit is typically calculated on the basis of
business information related to the promisee's operations, such as materials
and labor costs, inventory size, availability of alternative suppliers, the
identity of her downstream contracting partners (customers), and, in the
case of newer businesses, her business plan. This and other information
revealed during the discovery process may be information that the promisee
would prefer to keep private. First, revealing the information might damage
her bargaining position in future contract negotiations with this or another
transactor and might lead to her having to pay a higher price in future
transactions. The promisee's weakened bargaining position arises not only
because the promisor will know that, in the event of breach, he will have to
pay higher damages, but also, and more importantly, because he will learn
the true value of performance to the promisee. Knowing the value of
performance to the promisee should enable the promisor to extract a greater
share of the bargaining surplus in subsequent transactions. Second, if, at the
time a dispute arises, there are other executory contracts between the
transactors, the promisor may be able to use the information he obtains
during the pretrial discovery process to engage in profitable holdup under
these other contracts. Finally, even if the promisee does not intend to
transact with the breaching promisor again, the information revealed during
the course of the dispute may be used by other transactors with whom the
promisee has ongoing relationships, to engage in holdup, to justify demands
for adequate assurances of performance, or to extract additional increments
2. Scholars who have adopted primarily noneconomic approaches to contract law have also
endorsed the expectation measure. For example, Charles Fried argues that
[i]f I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my promise.
it is fair that I should be made to hand over the equivalent of the promised performance.
In contract doctrine this position appears as the expectation measure of damages for
breach.
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 17-28 (1981).
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of the bargaining surplus in future negotiations.3 The revelation of the
information may also weaken her bargaining position vis-A-vis banks
4
unions,' insurance companies, and secured creditors, as well as damage her
competitive position in a market.6 More generally, to the extent that the
3. The intuition developed in the text builds on and extends a literature that has focused on
understanding the way in which default rules could be structured to induce transactors to reveal
information at the bargaining stage of their relationship, which would, in turn. enable them to
obtain the efficiency benefits of contracting on the basis of commonly shared information. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing the idea of information-forcing default rules);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell. Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of
Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991) (examining how the
foreseeability limitation on contract damages affects transactors' incentives to communicate
information about the magnitude of their expected harm). For an intuitive overview of the
arguments in these papers, see also Ian Ayres. Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts. in I THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note I. at 585. In particular.
this Essay focuses on a concern that was introduced into this literature by Jason Johnston-
namely, the idea that well-informed parties may fail to bargain around even highly undesirable
default rules when doing so might force them to reveal information they would prefer to keep
private. See Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). For articles further modeling and discussing how these
types of informational and strategic concerns affect bargaining behavior, see, for example. Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optintal Choice of Legal
Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992), which explores parties' incentives to contract around default
rules when doing so is costly and reveals information; and Benjamin 2. Hermalin & Michael L
Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View
of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. EON. & ORG. 230 (1993). which analyzes the
role of default rules when contracts are incomplete due to asymmetric information. For a recent
addition to the literature that suggests additional reasons why transactors who expect to have high
damages from breach may not want to communicate this information ex ante, sec Barry E. Adler,
The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1547 (1999).
4. For example, if a buyer-manufacturer sues the supplier of a component of an important
product for breach of the warranty of quality, the information revealed in the suit (such as profit
forgone, the availability or nonavailability of alternative suppliers, and the delay in getting the
product to market) might lead a bank to restrict its line of credit to the manufacturer.
5. Revealing its profitability and its cost structure may damage a firm's bargaining position
vis-a-vis its unions during collective bargaining, causing it to incur an intra-firm secrecy cost.
Similarly, revealing some employees' salaries in a nonunion setting might lead to unrest in the
workforce or demands for salary parity.
6. This aspect of the secrecy interest is of increasing importance given the recent growth in a
type of business arrangement known as "'coopetition," in which "firms that are competitors.
sometimes even bitter rivals, agree to cooperate in specific market situations." Kenneth James.
Sometimes, It Pays To Sleep with the Enemy, Bus. TIMES, Mar. 16. 1999, at 14. "A company
could find itself serving as competitor, buyer, supplier, and party to another firm on any given
day." Harvey Meyer, My Enemy My Friend, J. Bus. STRATEGY, Sept.-Oct. 1998. at 42, 44.
When the contracts that govern these agreements are breached, secrecy concerns are likely to be
very important. Even in the absence of a dispute, managing the flow of information between
parties to coopetition agreements is considered one of the most difficult aspects of implementing
them:
An obvious disadvantage of these alliances is that your competitor is learning from
your operations, too.... [F]or that reason, you might want to assign someone to
oversee the alliance [that is, the competition agreement] to, among other things, prevent
information from a part of your business that's involved in head-to-head competition
with an alliance partner from inadvertently slipping into the competitor's hands....
[And it is desirable that] every coopetition have a pre-arranged exit strategy that takes
into account each firm's intellectual property and other resources.
Id. at 45-46.
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value of a firm is based on the value of the private information it
possesses-whether this information takes the form of a customer list or
any of a variety of forms of intellectual property-legal rules that require
the revelation of this information in order to obtain a remedy for breach of
contract or to enforce any other substantive legal right, may be undesirable.
Recognizing that an aggrieved party will often prefer to keep the
information necessary to establish the magnitude of expectation damages
private suggests that while the traditional literature on remedies has focused
on the aggrieved party's interest in being made whole (her "compensatory
interest"), there is another, potentially conflicting interest that needs to be
taken into account, namely her desire to keep information private (her
"secrecy interest"). Although the secrecy interest and the compensatory
interest are often in direct conflict, they cannot be reconciled simply by
elevating one over the other ex post. When the secrecy interest is
sufficiently strong, the cost of revealing the underlying private information
may well exceed the aggrieved party's expected recovery at trial. As a
consequence, the aggrieved party may not file suit and may therefore
receive no compensation. Because the existence of the promisee's secrecy
interest will often be known to a promisor who has either breached or is
contemplating breach, the secrecy interest may undermine the credibility of
the promisee's threat to sue.7 This in turn suggests that once the effect of
the secrecy interest on the aggrieved party's incentive to sue is taken into
account, it may be necessary to rethink the wisdom of fully compensatory
expectation damages. In contracting contexts in which the secrecy concern
is important,8 the use of a fully compensatory expectation measure in a
A "secrecy interest" vis-A-vis competitors may also exist even in more standard contractual
settings. Consider, for example, a manufacturer of a product who has invented a new low-cost
production process but who decides not to patent it because of the difficulty of detecting
infringers. In such a context, the manufacturer would be reluctant to sue any outside suppliers
whose inputs contributed to the product, or any buyers of the product who cancelled orders, since
she would have to reveal her unit cost either to recover lost profit as part of the expectation
measure or to establish herself as a lost-volume seller. See infra note 51. If she did this and her
costs were revealed to be far below her competitors' costs, competitors would conclude she had a
trade-secret production process and might try to hire away her employees to obtain it.
7. A threat to sue is credible if, in the absence of settlement, the plaintiff would find it in her
interest to maintain the suit through trial.
8. It is difficult to construct an accurate empirical measure of the economy-wide importance
of the secrecy interest. Most evidence suggesting that secrecy is important might be partly
explained by other considerations. Although some examples of plaintiffs' secrecy interests can be
found in decided cases such as Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 209 Cal.
Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 56-58; and Louis Weinberg
Assocs. v. Monte Christi Corp., 15 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), discussed infra note 98. even if
most aggrieved parties had a secrecy interest, the theory discussed in the text suggests that very
few of them would sue. As a consequence, decided cases in which a plaintiffs secrecy interest is
apparent are likely to be uncommon. Nevertheless, decided cases do provide substantial evidence
that the types of secrecy concerns discussed in the text are important. Case reports are replete with
references to defendants' attempts to keep private just the type of information that plaintiffs arc
also likely to prefer to keep secret. See cases cited infra notes 97-98, This selection effect, which
1888 [Vol. 109: 1885
The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law
regime with liberal rules of civil discovery may fail to achieve the widely
accepted remedial goal of full ex post compensation. It may also fail to
induce efficient breach-or-perform decisions because promisors will realize
that promisees with a sufficiently strong secrecy interest may not have a
credible threat to sue. In addition, the availability of the expectation
measure may, in some contexts, lead a promisor to breach solely in the
hope that a promisee will sue and that he will be able to obtain valuable
information.
This Essay develops the concept of the secrecy interest in more detail
and considers how taking it into account might contribute to the debate over
the desirability of several of the Code's remedial provisions, the remedial
structure of the new proposed Code,9 and aspects of existing adjudicative
procedures. It argues that given the liberal approach to discovery in effect
in American jurisdictions, the Code's remedial provisions are not mere
default rules, but rather are quasi-mandatory rules that cannot be fully
contracted around. It then suggests that the Code and the rules of civil
procedure should be amended in ways that enable contracting parties to opt
for damage measures and discovery procedures that do not require them to
reveal private, firm-specific information. More broadly, the Essay
demonstrates that there is often a hidden, secrecy-related cost to obtaining
compensation, and suggests that this cost may account, in part, for
businessmen's hostility to the economists' notion of efficient breach.
Part I develops the theoretical claim. It explores the tension between
protecting an aggrieved party's secrecy interest and protecting her
compensatory interest. After introducing the distinction between subjective
damage measures that require the revelation of firm-specific information
and objective damages measures that do not, it suggests that in devising
optimal remedies it is essential to take into account the type of information
that the remedy requires the parties to provide rather than merely the
magnitude of the recovery permitted. Part II considers how taking into
account the aggrieved party's secrecy interest might change the standard
analysis of various Code provisions and proposed Code provisions as well
as their associated Official Comments and common-law doctrines. It also
considers ways in which remedial rules as well as the rules and doctrines
relating to cover, mitigation, performance, and adequate assurances of
performance might be restructured to strike a more desirable balance
between the secrecy interest and the compensatory interest. Part II explores
the implications of identifying the secrecy interest for the design of
adjudicative procedures. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting that the
leads to relatively few cases being brought in which plaintiffs have substantial secrecy interests,
may account, in part, for the failure of courts to develop common-law doctrines that take the
secrecy interest into account.
9. References to the "proposed Code" are to the U.C.C. art. 2 (Proposed Revisions 1999).
2000] 1889
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Code's own stated goal of protecting the compensatory interest might be
better served if the law were structured to take the secrecy interest into
account.
I. THE COMPENSATORY INTEREST AND THE SECRECY INTEREST IN
CONTRACT DAMAGES
A. Introducing the Secrecy Interest
The economic literature on damage remedies has focused primarily on
two polar cases-discrete exchange between strangers where expectation
damages are superior (traditional law and economics)," and long-term,
repeat-play transactions among transactors who are perfectly constrained by
reputation bonds and therefore find recourse to damages unnecessary (game
theory)." The literature has, however, ignored an important class of
transactions, exemplified by buyer-supplier relationships in nonperfectly
competitive markets, where reputation is a significant, yet imperfect,
constraint on transactors' behavior. In these relationships transactors either
deal with one another on a repeat basis or with others in the market over an
extended period of time, under numerous short-term contracts whose price
and other terms are negotiated anew with some regularity. 2 Because buyers
and suppliers in relationships of this sort are constantly negotiating and
renegotiating their agreements, each desires to keep private the information
that would reveal its reservation price-that is, the price at which each
would find it desirable to walk away from the proposed transaction. 3 As a
10. For an overview of this literature, see the sources cited supra note 1.
11. For an overview of this literature, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 165-78 (1994), and the sources referenced therein.
12. The literature has also ignored a class of long-term contracts, under which if a dispute
arises and the contract is not terminated, the breaching party may be able to acquire information
during the course of the dispute that will enable him to engage in holdup during the life of the
contract.
13. To illustrate the advantage of keeping information private, consider the following
example. Suppose a buyer and a seller are bargaining over the price of one unit of a good and that
there are no third parties bidding on or offering to sell this good. Assume that the buyer's
valuation of the unit is distributed uniformly between $100 and $200, that the buyer knows her
actual valuation, that the seller only knows the distribution of valuations among buyers as a group.
and that the seller's cost of producing the good is zero, so he would be willing to sell it for any
price. Further assume that there is only one round of bargaining in which the seller makes one
take-it-or-leave-it offer and that the buyer would accept any offer that would give her a
nonnegative payoff, and would reject any offer that would leave her with a negative payoff.
Consider the thought process of a buyer who is trying to decide whether she is better off
concealing or revealing her private information. Such a buyer will reason that if she conceals the
information, the seller will bargain with her as if she is a random draw from the distribution of
buyer valuations and will demand the price that maximizes his expected return. In such a
situation, the seller will demand a price of $100. At this price, the probability that the offer will be
accepted is I (which corresponds to the likelihood, from the seller's point of view, that the buyer's
valuation exceeds $100), so the seller's payoff would be a sure $100. If, however, the seller asked
1890 [Vol. 109: 1885
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consequence, when a dispute arises, an aggrieved party may often find it
desirable to seek or settle for significantly less than full compensation if
doing so enables her to keep valuable information secret. The expected gain
from having a stronger bargaining position in future transactions and not
weakening her bargaining position vis-a-vis other executory contracts with
this or other transactors often outweighs the benefits of a higher immediate
monetary recovery. In some contracting contexts, the long-term monetary
and strategic value of an aggrieved party's secrecy interest outweighs the
monetary value of her short-term compensatory interest.
The tension between satisfying the secrecy interest and satisfying the
compensatory interest is greater the less competitive the market and the
longer the information in question retains its secrecy value. 4 The tension is
also more pronounced the longer the breached-against party thinks she will
want to deal with this transactor or, in the case of information with a
market-wide value, transactors in this particular market.' 5
for a higher price, his expected payoff from the transaction would be lower because the higher
price he might obtain would be more than offset by the reduced likelihood that the offer would be
accepted. For example, a price of $120 will be accepted with probability 0.8. giving the seller an
expected payoffof 0.8 X $120 = S96. Similarly, a lower price would not affect the likelihood that
the offer will be accepted (which is already 1), but given the reduction in price would reduce the
seller's expected revenue from the transaction. In such a situation, given that the seller would
demand $100, the buyer would accept the offer, and her benefit from the transaction would be her
true valuation less $100. Thus, unless her true valuation is the lowest possible one ($100), the
buyer will enjoy a positive surplus from the transaction. (For example, if the buyer's actual
valuation turns out to be $120, she will obtain a net benefit of $20.) If. instead, the buyer were to
reveal her true valuation to the seller, she would be worse off. The seller would then demand a
price equal to (or slightly under) the buyer's known valuation, thereby fully exploiting his
bargaining power. In such a situation, the buyer's share in the surplus will be reduced to nearly
zero. Qualitatively similar results follow regardless of the distribution of bargaining power
between the buyer and the seller.
14. In general, markets are less competitive the fewer alternative trading partners each
transactor has and the larger the switching or search costs that are involved in terminating one
contracting relationship and entering into a new one. Unlike in perfectly competitive markets,
where prices are competed down to the point at which transactors do not make more than normal
(standard) profits, in less competitive markets transactors negotiating a contract price are also
bargaining over the division of the surplus created by the greater-than-normal profits arising from
the transaction. The less competitive the market, the greater the potential surplus to be divided.
Because transactors may be able to secure a greater fraction of the bargaining surplus by keeping
their information private, their secrecy interests become stronger the larger the surplus, that is, the
less competitive the market.
15. Returning to the example discussed supra note 13. suppose that the buyer's actual
valuation of the unit is $120. If this information remains private, she would expect to obtain a net
gain of $20 in each subsequent transaction (recall from above that an uninformed seller will
demand a price of $100). In such a situation, if a breach occurred and the buyer thought that her
relationship with the seller was likely to continue for a long time (and no similarly advantageous
alternative contracting partners were available), she might prefer to give up the right to recover
full expectation damages, here a one-time payment of $120, in order to secure a future stream of
transactions each producing a net benefit of $20 each. Even if the buyer significantly discounts
future gains, the longer the buyer thinks the contracting relationship will last, the greater the
bargaining advantage the buyer enjoys from keeping information private.
2000] 1891
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Before attempting to structure remedies in a way that will be sensitive
to both interests, it is important to consider why it might be desirable to
take the secrecy interest into account in designing remedies. From a social
point of view, private information is a barrier to mutually beneficial
exchange; 6 it is a type of transaction cost that may prevent transactors from
capturing a potential surplus 17 or may lead them to enter into inefficient
transactions." In an ideal world, more efficient bargaining outcomes are
reached when information is commonly shared. 9 In such a world, it would
be desirable to structure the legal rules to give transactors incentives to
reveal, rather than obscure, their private information, thereby inducing them
to enter into exchanges whose terms are "First-Best" from a social
perspective." In the real world, however, transactors' private interest in
keeping information secret makes the goal of full information revelation
within a particular market unattainable. Rather than reveal such
information, transactors will often prefer to forgo suit in the event of
breach, change their patterns of contracting, change important aspects of the
terms on which they deal, or forgo the transaction entirely. A manufacturer
might, for example, choose to produce a key component of a product in-
house even if she could purchase it more cheaply, if, in the event of a
16. For a general discussion of contracting under asymmetric information and a bibliography
of technical papers on the subject, see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 11, at 79-158.
17. For transactors to maximize the potential surplus, it is also necessary to induce efficient
reliance expenditures. When the level of reliance expenditures cannot be directly stipulated in the
contract, perhaps because there are ex post verification problems, it is nevertheless possible to
induce efficient reliance investments if the ex post value obtained by each party is observable.
See, e.g., Shavell, Contracts, supra note 1, at 442 (surveying the economic literature on
structuring contracts to induce efficient reliance investments). However, when one or both
transactors' ex post valuations are unobservable, their ability to write a contract that will induce
efficient reliance is severely limited.
18. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 84-86 (2d ed.
1995) (suggesting that asymmetric information about reservation values is one reason transactors
may fall to reach an agreement); David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 275-78 and sources referenced
therein (providing a summary of the economic literature on bargaining in the presence of
asymmetric information).
19. In the example supra note 13, suppose that the seller's cost of producing the good is $100
(instead of zero). In this case, the uninformed seller's optimal strategy is to offer a price of $150.
Under this strategy, there is a 0.5 probability that the buyer will reject the offer (the likelihood that
the buyer's valuation is less than $150), and that no transaction will take place. More generally, if
the buyer's valuation is greater than $100 but less than $150, there will be no transaction even
though the transaction is efficient, and a social surplus equal to the difference between the buyer's
valuation and the seller's cost will be forgone.
20. A First-Best (or a Pareto-efficient complete-contingent) contract is a contract that cannot
be modified in a way that will raise the expected utility of both transactors. Fully informed
rational transactors would enter into a First-Best contract if there were no transaction costs and no
verification or enforcement problems ex post. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Law and
Economics, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS § 4.1.1 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 2000). A Second-Best (or economically incomplete) contract is the best set of contractual
terms that the parties can enter into given the existence of transaction costs, asymmetric
information, or ex post verifiability and enforceability problems. See id. § 4.1.4. This Essay
focuses on Second-Best problems arising from asymmetric information.
[Vol. 109: 18851892
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dispute with an outside supplier, she would have to reveal costly private
information. From a policy perspective, the challenge therefore becomes to
structure legal rules in general, and damage remedies in particular, to
achieve "Second-Best" outcomes in transactional contexts that to a greater
or lesser degree will always be characterized by asymmetric information.2,'
In particular, damage measures like fully compensatory expectation
damages that give efficient breach-or-perform incentives in an ideal world
should be replaced or supplemented by measures that take into account the
secrecy interest of the aggrieved party and the type of discovery that will be
available.
B. Objective Versus Subjective Measures of Damages
In order to discuss how the law ought to reconcile the secrecy interest
and the compensatory interest, it is useful to classify potential damage
measures into two broad categories. The first category consists of measures
that neither require the aggrieved party to reveal nor permit the breaching
party to discover firm-specific information ("objective damages"). An
example of an objective damage measure is the contract-market differential,
which can be established by reference to the contract price and a market
price based on either publicly available price quotes or the rates charged by
other firms. The second category of damage measures consists of measures
that either require the revelation or permit the discovery of firm-specific
information (" subjective damages"). An example of a subjective damage
measure is the expectation remedy, which seeks to put the aggrieved party
in the same position she would have been in had the contract been
performed. The expectation measure is calculated on the basis of such
measures as the profit lost by this promisee, the incidental damage incurred
by this promisee and, as in Hadley v. Baxendale,2- the type of information
about special circumstances or potential losses that was communicated by
this promisee to the breaching party.
21. The ex post revelation of information that is required by subjective damage measures and
the rules of discovery may also reduce transactors' incentives either to deliberately acquire certain
types of information or to invest in the types of innovations and activities whose profitability is
dependent on keeping information private. Consider again the manufacturer discussed supra note
6, who invents a low-cost production process for a product. If she brings a suit for damages
against a supplier of a component, she will have to reveal her cost of production. which may
induce her competitors to try to obtain information about her production process. Protecting this
type of information from revelation in such a suit would have the beneficial effect of preserving or
enhancing transactors' incentives to devise such innovations in the fist place. More generally,
there are many contracting contexts in which protecting private information ex post is likely to
create more efficient ex ante incentives to gather and use information. As a greater proportion of
many firms' valuations come to turn on the value of their intellectual property, this consideration
is likely to become more important.
22. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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Generally speaking, objective remedies tend to do a relatively good job
of protecting the aggrieved party's secrecy interest, but will often fail to
protect her compensatory interest23 because they do not take transaction-
specific elements of value into account. In contrast, subjective remedies
seriously jeopardize the aggrieved party's secrecy interest, and while they
may appear to be well-suited to the goal of full compensation since they are
closely tailored to the actual losses of a particular aggrieved party, they may
also jeopardize her compensatory interest, once the interplay between the
secrecy interest and the compensatory interest is taken into account. When
only subjective remedies like the expectation measure are available, an
aggrieved party who is concerned with keeping information private may be
reluctant to file a suit. Such a party may rationally prefer to forgo her
compensatory interest because pursuing a subjective remedy would give the
defendant the right to obtain her valuable private information through
discovery. Moreover, in situations in which the existence of the potential
aggrieved party's secrecy interest is known to a promisor contemplating
breach, the would-be aggrieved party's threat to sue in the event of breach
may lose its credibility, thereby increasing the likelihood of breach and
further jeopardizing her compensatory interest. This analysis suggests that
while contract theorists have focused on figuring out the optimal magnitude
of contract damages, it is also crucial to take into account the types of
information a particular damage measure will force the aggrieved party to
reveal, and permit the breaching party to discover, if a dispute arises.
It is therefore necessary to consider whether it is possible to find an
alternative to the subjective, perfectly compensatory expectation measure
that creates more efficient breach-or-perform incentives and better protects
the aggrieved party's compensatory interest once the effect of the remedy
on the aggrieved party's incentive to file suit is taken into account.
C. Average Expectation Damages
In attempting to structure such a remedy, it is useful to consider a
situation in which a promisor contemplating breach does not know the
actual loss that the breach will cause the promisee-a paradigmatic case of
asymmetric information. In deciding whether or not to breach, the promisor
will attempt to estimate the expected value of the damages he will be
ordered to pay if suit is brought and will make his decision accordingly. In
such a situation, if the law imposed a measure of damages that did not
condition on the aggrieved party's subjective loss but was equal to the
promisor's estimate of the aggrieved party's loss-for analytic convenience
23. See sources cited infra notes 49, 93 (suggesting that contract-market damages rarely
correspond to the aggrieved party's actual loss).
1894 [Vol. 109: 1885
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think of this as "average expectation" damages across the market-the
promisor's breach-or-perform decisions under this " flat" measure of
damages would be the same as they would be if the law provided for
the recovery of fully compensatory expectation damages. As has been
recognized in the tort literature, accuracy in the assessment of damages is
socially beneficial only if it can improve incentives ex ante-that is, only
if the person contemplating an action has access to the more accurate
information at a reasonable cost at the time he is deciding how to act. 4 In
contracting contexts where the promisee's value of performance is private
information, imposing a subjectively tailored damage measure ex post
would not give the promisor the optimal incentive to perform or breach that
it would in a world of full information. In fact, as compared to an "average
expectation" measure, the imposition of subjectively measured expectation
damages would compromise the aggrieved party's secrecy interest without
creating any improvement in the promisor's breach-or-perform incentives.
Moreover, the use of subjectively tailored expectation damages
designed to fully compensate the aggrieved party may actually result in her
receiving less compensation than she would under an undercompensatory
objective measure, once the effect of her secrecy interest on her incentive to
sue is taken into account. 5 If, however, a court were to apply some flat
measure of damages that did not require the revelation of firm-specific
24. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis. 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. Accuracy in the Assessment of
Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996); see also Lucian Aryc Bebchuk & Steven Shavell.
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive To Reveal Information, 51 STAN. L REV.
1615 (1999) (pointing out that a promisor who is uninformed about a promisee's actual loss
cannot take accurately tailored precautions against breach).
25. In many litigation contexts, a plaintiff who does not have a credible threat to take a case
to trial-perhaps because litigation costs are larger than her expected recovery. giving her claim a
negative expected value-may nevertheless be able to extract a settlement. For an overview of the
wide variety of models and intuitions that have been developed to explain such settlements, see
generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Erpected Value, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 1. at 551. However. a plaintiff whose
claim has a negative expected value because her secrecy interest outweighs her expected recovery
is less likely to obtain a settlement, because there is an important difference between the effects of
traditional litigation costs and secrecy costs on the credibility of a plaintiff's threat to sue.
Ordinary litigation costs are generally assumed to be accrued in relatively continuous and fairly
uniform fashion throughout the litigation process. At each stage of discovery, the cost of moving
to the next stage is relatively small, so a plaintiff's threat to go forward is likely to be credible. In
contrast, a large portion of a plaintiff's secrecy costs are incurred in a lump sum early on in the
discovery process, particularly since the passage of FED. R. CiV. P. 26(a)(l)(C). which imposes a
duty on the plaintiff immediately to disclose - a computation of any category of damages claimed
by the disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying... the documents or other
evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is
based." As a consequence, a plaintiff's threat to proceed through the early stages of discovery is
not likely to be credible if she has a substantial secrecy interest. See generally LUCIAN ARYE
BEBCHUK, ON DviSIBsnLrry AND CREDIBILITY: THE EFFECTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF
LITIGATION COSTS OVER TIME ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THREATS To SUE (Harvard Program in
Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 190, 1996) (demonstrating that the credibility of a plaintiffs
threat to sue is affected by the sequence, magnitude, and timing of the plaintiffs litigation costs).
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information, the aggrieved party might well file suit and recover the "flat"
measure of damages, thereby receiving at least some compensation.26
In theory, then, in some transactional contexts characterized by
asymmetric information, the award of a flat damages measure set at an
amount approximating "average expectation" damages would be superior
to the award of subjectively tailored expectation damages. Unlike in the tort
context, however, where actuarial tables make the award of a meaningful
average measure of damages feasible, using an "average expectation"
measure in the contracts context would require courts to make factual
determinations-such as the underlying statistical distribution of the profit
parameter-that in most cases they are ill-equipped to make.27
The challenge, then, is to think about feasible alternatives to the
analytically attractive "average expectation" measure. However, before
doing so, it is useful to explore in more detail how transactors with secrecy
interests might bargain in the shadow of different types of default rules and
to consider the ways that they might attempt to hide, signal, or
communicate information.
26. Even if the flat measure was somewhat overcompensatory, the deadweight loss created by
the efficient breaches that it prevented might be more than offset by the deadweight cost of the
inefficient breaches it prevented.
27. It is far more difficult to figure out the distribution of profit and mean profit across a
broader population than it is to measure actual damages, even when such damages include highly
idiosyncratic components. Moreover, evidence regarding average lost profit may not be accessible
to the parties. The secrecy concerns of third-party market participants as well as antitrust
limitations on gathering information on competitors' prices and costs would limit parties' access
to this type of information.
However, damage measures that are conceptually similar to average expectation damages are
sometimes used to establish the expected lost profit of a new business. In Chung v. Kaonohi
Center Co., 618 P.2d 283, 291-92 & nn.7-9 (Haw. 1980), for example, the court admitted expert
testimony on the anticipated lost profit of a new business that was based on "three different
valuation approaches-a reproduction cost analysis[, which is "[t]he cost, based on current prices.
of reproducing the assets of the business" ], a comparative market analysis [in which "[rlecently
sold businesses of a similar nature are compared by both gross and net income to the subject
business to indicate a fair market value"], and an income stream analysis." For additional
permissible techniques, see 2 ROY RYDEN ANDERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 11:27 (1991). Given that these techniques are currently used in new
business cases, it might be desirable to permit a plaintiff to use them in the established business
context as well, even though they are likely to be systematically biased downward relative to the
true harm suffered since the burden of proof placed on those who seek to establish lost profit
using these measures is extraordinarily high and some elements of this type of harm are still often
excluded by courts on the grounds that they have not been established with sufficient certainty.
See id. §§ 11:22, 11:26. Some commentators have suggested that courts should permit the use of
industry averages to establish aggregate lost profit when the dispersal across the relevant set of
firms is small, a rule that makes good sense as a way of meeting the doctrinal requirement of
certainty in the new business context. See Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372 (Mich.
1976). This approach, however, would undermine the usefulness of these techniques as a practical
solution to problems created by the secrecy interest, because it is precisely when a profit varies
across firms that a secrecy interest is most likely to be present. In addition, while using industry
averages in this way may open the door to overcompensatory recoveries when the plaintiff has a
particularly low cost of production, this is precisely the situation where her secrecy interest is
likely to be the greatest. See supra note 6.
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D. The (Potential) Unraveling of Private Informnation
In thinking about how transactors' secrecy interests would affect the
ways they bargain in the shadow of different remedy-related default rules, it
is important to take into account that while some transactors prefer to keep
certain types of information private, others have an incentive to reveal
precisely the same types of information in an effort to obtain more
favorable terms. Consider, for example, a seller who is negotiating with a
buyer who attaches a higher-than-average value to a good. In bargaining
with such a buyer, an uninformed seller will behave as if he is bargaining
with an average-value buyer. The buyer should therefore be able to retain a
greater portion of the consumer surplus than she would if the informational
asymmetry were eliminated. Now consider a seller who is negotiating with
a buyer who attaches a lower-than-average value to the good. Such a seller
will also behave as if he is bargaining with an average-value buyer. As a
consequence, a low-value buyer would be hurt by the existence of this
asymmetry of information and might do much better if the seller knew her
true valuation. Buyers with below-average valuations therefore have
a strong incentive to reveal their "type" to sellers in an effort to obtain
a lower price. This, in turn, suggests that low-value buyers might trigger
an information-unraveling process that would result in a separating
equilibrium in which each type of buyer agreed to a liquidated-damages
provision reflecting her type.'
Although plausible in theory, the unraveling of information is unlikely
to occur in practice. First, in order for unraveling to take place, a low-value
buyer will have to be able to credibly communicate her type to the seller.
The seller will not simply accept the buyer's assertion that she is a low-
value type. High-value buyers also have an incentive to pose as low-value
buyers, since this may help them capture a larger share of the consumer
surplus.29 As a consequence, a low-value buyer will have to prove to the
28. For a rigorous discussion of the conditions under which such unraveling might occur, see
Robert H1 Germer, Disclosure and Unraveling, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 605. For another mechanism of information-
unraveling, whereby buyers with different valuations accept different liquidated-damages
provisions, see Alan Schwartz, The Myth 77Tat Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies:
An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE LJ. 369 (1990) (examining the
ability of sellers to "screen" buyers' types through a "menu" of price and liquidated-damages
terms).
29. Although a high-value buyer who masquerades as a low-value buyer sacrifices a
significant portion of the expectation remedy she could potentially enjoy in the event of breach,
and reduces the seller's incentives to take extra precautions to avoid breach, she might
nevertheless benefit from misleading the seller. In a market in which the seller has bargaining
power, pooling with low-value buyers may enable her to obtain a better price. More generally, the
likelihood that high-value types can masquerade as low-value types depends strongly on the
relevant market structure. Under the assumption in the text that the relevant markets are far from
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seller that she is a low-value buyer in order to induce the seller to deal with
her on more favorable terms. Since a buyer's type depends, in part, on her
expected profits, she will have to be able to credibly communicate the
magnitude of her expected profit to the seller. Profit, however, is not a
measure that is observable to the seller. Because profit is calculated on the
basis of revenues less costs, in the absence of a way for the seller to be sure
that the buyer has completely revealed all relevant information-such as the
discovery process-the buyer has a strong incentive to understate her
revenues and overstate her costs in order to appear to be a low-value type."
As a consequence, credible revelation of information about transactors' true
valuations cannot readily occur.
Although a low-value buyer might attempt to communicate information
about her true valuation by offering to include a low liquidated-damages
provision in the contract, the mere fact of the offer will not credibly reveal
information. Because high-value buyers who are vulnerable to extraction of
their consumer surplus might also offer to include low liquidated-damages
provisions in an effort to convince sellers that their reservation price is low,
the fact that a particular buyer offers to include such a provision is a noisy
signal that gives the seller little reliable information.31
One might also be concerned about the unraveling of information ex
post, as low-value buyers unconcerned with secrecy brought suit, leading
sellers to conclude that those who did not sue in the event of breach were
high-value types. If buyers' decisions about whether or not to sue were
based on nothing other than their secrecy interests and their expected
recoveries, and if the scope and magnitude of sellers' discovery efforts were
determined solely by their desire to obtain as much information as possible
about a buyer's type, such unraveling might well occur. In practice,
however, this type of unraveling is also unlikely. To see why, consider a
low-value buyer who is deciding whether to sue. Even if she gets some
next-round price advantage from firmly establishing the upper bound of her
price range, she might not sue. First, if her loss is truly small and litigation
costs are high, it might not be worthwhile for her to sue. Second, any
perfectly competitive, such masquerading is possible, but in a perfectly competitive market it is
unlikely. See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 24, at 1620-21.
30. This may be much more difficult to do in a public company given the extensive regime of
legally required disclosures. However, since the relevant information in this context may be far
more detailed than the legally required disclosures, public companies may also have substantial
secrecy interests.
31. A seller who recognizes the high-value buyer's incentive to masquerade as a low-value
buyer is likely to ignore or highly discount the informational content of a liquidated-damages
provision. Such a seller will respond with a lower price only to the extent that the lower damages
reduce the liability (and precaution) costs he will find it desirable to bear. He will not, however.
view a low damages clause as a credible signal of the buyer's valuation and will not offer the
same price that he would have offered had he thought that he was negotiating with a true low-
value buyer.
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benefit she might get from revealing this information will only be obtained
if she deals with this seller again, or if it helps her in negotiating with other
sellers. However, as between these two parties, filing suit is likely to
damage their contracting relationship, thereby reducing the likelihood that
they will do business together in the future. And, as between the aggrieved
party and other transactors, the information-revelation effect may be weak
because other transactors may be reluctant to rely on the thoroughness of
the breaching party's discovery efforts in a suit in which the amount in
controversy is relatively small. Third, it is not always advantageous for a
firm to appear to its contracting partners as a very low-profit firm, since this
might result in its being offered less advantageous credit terms. Now
consider a high-value buyer who is contemplating suit. One possibility is
that she will ask for only a low measure of damages. If she does so, a seller
might engage in discovery to obtain full information, but he may also forgo
all or part of this costly process and accept the buyer's valuation. Although
the seller will know his level of discovery effort and will be able to use
information about the buyer's true valuation if he obtains it, other
transactors will not know how thoroughly he searched the buyer's records.
Other transactors may therefore be unable to assess the likelihood that there
are other hidden costs or revenues. This, in turn, makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for them to determine the buyer's type with much accuracy
(although they may still learn many things the buyer prefers to keep
private), thus reducing the likelihood that unraveling will occur.
E. (Potentially) Secrecy-Preserving Subjective Damages
Recognizing the secrecy interest also has implications for
understanding the ways that the two other main measures of contract
damages-restitution and reliance-might affect transactors' behavior.
Most importantly, it provides a reason that an aggrieved party might prefer
to seek restitution or reliance damages rather than expectation damages,
even in contexts in which restitution or reliance damages result in a lower
recovery and expectation damages are relatively inexpensive to prove.
In theory, restitution damages are measured by reference to the value
conferred by the aggrieved party on the breaching party. When strictly
applied, they therefore protect the aggrieved party's secrecy interest
because they do not require her to reveal private information about her
operations. Although restitution damages are generally lower than
expectation damages, recognizing the effect of the secrecy interest on the
aggrieved party's incentive to sue suggests that the lower restitution remedy
may result in more compensation than the expectation measure. Moreover,
because restitution damages may, in some contexts, jeopardize the
breaching party's secrecy interest, they may in fact provide a greater
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deterrent to breach than previously recognized.32 In fact, recognizing the
secrecy interest suggests that it might be desirable to give the aggrieved
party the right to freely elect to seek restitution damages regardless of the
magnitude of expectation damages because doing so will enhance the
credibility of her threat to sue.33 It also suggests that it might be desirable to
develop a more far-reaching restitution measure that could better protect the
interests of aggrieved parties with substantial secrecy concerns.'
Reliance damages, in contrast, require the aggrieved party to reveal
firm-specific information and under current doctrine will often jeopardize
her secrecy interest. In general, an aggrieved party may seek reliance
damages if expectation damages are either difficult to prove or inadequate. 5
However, a breaching party is entitled to deduct from the reliance measure
"whatever he can prove the promisee would have lost if the contract had
been fully performed," 36 and the need to establish the magnitude of this
offset gives him access to the discovery needed to establish what
expectation damages would have been. This suggests that the availability of
reliance damages does not provide much protection to an aggrieved party's
secrecy interest.37 However, if an aggrieved party were permitted to seek
32. Where a bilateral secrecy interest exists, giving either party the right to seek restitution
damages in the event of breach may prevent various types of opportunism.
33. In other doctrinal contexts, courts have recognized that the use of damage measures that
jeopardize a party's secrecy interest may also compromise her substantive rights. See, e.g., Snepp
v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980) (rejecting the use of a compensation-based remedy
for breach of an employee's fiduciary duty-a duty that was defined in part by an employment
contract-in favor of a disgorgement measure of damages on the grounds that requiring the
employer to demonstrate its actual loss would require it to reveal the very information the
employee was supposed to keep secret).
34. However, because restitution for breach of contract is only awarded when a breach is
material, and demonstrating the materiality of a breach may also reveal information, this
requirement would have to be eliminated to turn restitution into a fully objective remedy.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 & cmt. a; see also Security Stove &
Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 51 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (permitting the
plaintiff to recover reliance damages in a context in which expectation damages would have been
nominal).
36. L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber, 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949); see also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 837 (3d ed. 1999) (" [Tbo the extent that the party in breach can prove
with reasonable certainty that the injured party's expectation interest was less than its reliance
interest, so that performance of the contract would have resulted in a net loss to that party rather
than a net profit, the amount of that loss would be subtracted from the cost of reliance.").
37. The difficulty of limiting the scope of discovery when the reliance measure is sought may
account, in part, for the fact that in certain types of contracting relationships, settlement norms
have arisen that dictate what components of reliance damages should be recompensed in the
settlement of particular types of disputes. For example, in his seminal study of the contracting
practices of Wisconsin manufacturing concerns, Stewart Macaulay found that even in buyer-
supplier contracting relationships in which the aggrieved party would be entitled to recover
expectation damages, when breach occurred suits were rarely filed and expectation damages were
rarely sought in settlement. Rather, "all ten of the purchasing agents asked about cancellation of
orders once placed indicated that they expected to be able to cancel orders freely subject to only
an obligation to pay for the sellers' major expenses," that is, some of his reliance expenditures.
Similarly, "[a]ll 17 sales personnel asked reported that they often had to accept cancellation."
Stewart Macaulay, Noncontractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 25 AM. SOC.
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reliance damages regardless of the profitability of the contract, the size of
expectation damages, or the ease or difficulty of proving expectation
damages, the reliance measure would be transformed into a desirable
secrecy-preserving damage measure. If there were an element of reliance
expense that was compensable but had a relatively high associated "'secrecy
cost," the aggrieved party could opt not to request compensation for it,
while not forfeiting her right to recover other reliance expenditures.
F. Conclusion
In sum, recognizing the existence of an aggrieved party's secrecy
interest suggests that perfectly tailored, fully compensatory expectation
damages may not always be the most desirable remedy for breach of
contract. The critique of the expectation measure that emerges from taking
the secrecy interest into account differs from most critiques of the
expectation measure, which have focused largely on courts' limited ability
to verify the magnitude of important components of the expectation
measure, such as lost profit.38 In fact, it is precisely when ex post
verification of the aggrieved party's actual loss is cheapest and most
accurate that her secrecy interest is most likely to be jeopardized if
expectation damages are the sole remedy available in the event of breach.
In thinking about how to restructure remedies to take the secrecy
interest into account, it is important to note that even if a significant
percentage of litigated disputes are absolute end-game disputes among
transactors who will never deal with one another again, the secrecy interest
remains important. First, as discussed earlier, an aggrieved party's secrecy
interest often extends to keeping information from third parties or intra-firm
constituencies such as labor unions. Second, in situations in which a party
contemplating breach knows that a potentially aggrieved party has a strong
REv. 55, 60-62 (1963). Similarly, another study of contractual relationships between
manufacturers and those with whom they deal found that "[o]nly 10% of the manufacturers
responding to the Questionnaire ever make it their practice to sue upon cancellation of an order."
and that "[o]f the total number of manufacturers, 69, who indicated that they arc most likely to
pursue a particular course of action against a defaulting customer, 30% always or usually take no
action at all, 61% settle for expenses incurred, and 9% insist upon a scttlemcnt of expenses plus
lost profits." Comment, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-Appraisal in
Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE LJ. 1038, 1061 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
38. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance. 89 YALE I. 271, 277
(1979) ("[P]romisees possess better information than courts as to ... the adequacy of
damages... because promisees are more familiar with the costs that breach imposes on them.");
Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract
Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REv. 341 (1984) (arguing that courts face severe evidentiary problems in
accurately calculating the magnitude of expectation damages); c. Richard A. Epstein. Beyond
Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989)
(exploring a variety of reasons apart from the difficulty of assessing their magnitude that
expectation damages might not be the most desirable remedy).
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secrecy interest, he may be more likely to breach and trigger an end-game
dispute than he would be if the aggrieved party could opt for some
objective measure of damages. Third, recognition of the secrecy interest
suggests that making an objective remedy available would prevent some
inefficient breaches, thereby reducing the number of end-game disputes that
arise. Finally, the use of an objective measure might increase the likelihood
that a transactional relationship will be resumed after a breach because it
would simplify the issues in dispute, reduce the amount of discovery, and
increase the likelihood that a settlement would be reached in cases where
liability was clear.
II. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
Recognizing the "secrecy interest" suggests a number of
considerations that need to be taken into account in assessing the
desirability of various of the Code's and proposed Code's remedy-related
provisions-such as liquidated damages, specific performance, capping
damages at the aggrieved party's actual loss, cover, and mitigation. It also
suggests that the radical change in remedial hierarchy introduced in the
proposed Code-a change that imposes an actual-damages cap on virtually
all monetary recoveries-is deeply flawed because it opens the door to
wide-ranging discovery and thereby makes it impossible for an aggrieved
party to seek a truly objective measure of damages.39
A. Liquidated Damages
As a condition of enforceability, the Code requires liquidated-damages
provisions to be evaluated ex post to ensure that they are "reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy." 4° This scrutiny suggests that only
liquidated-damages provisions motivated by the difficulty of measuring
damages are legitimate, while those intended to function as a penalty or
even as an earnest of performance are not.
Recognizing the secrecy interest, however, suggests a reason, wholly
apart from coercion or lack of sophistication, that transactors would
benefit from entering into a liquidated-damages provision (even a highly
undercompensatory provision) that would be summarily enforced. The
39. But see James J. White, The Decline of the Contract Market Damage Model, I I U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 19 (1988-1989) (supporting the expansion of actual-damages caps as a
desirable and "modest proposal").
40. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1998).
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inclusion of such a provision would enable them to secure compensation
without revealing as much firm-specific information as they would have to
reveal ex post if the contract were breached and expectation damages
sought.4 When the inclusion of a liquidated-damages provision is
motivated by the secrecy interest, the Code's ex post scrutiny greatly
reduces, and in some instances eliminates, the benefits of the provision. The
type of information that a defendant is permitted to discover to substantiate
a claim that a liquidated-damages provision is invalid is exactly the same
information (and perhaps a bit more) that he would be entitled to obtain had
the plaintiff sought expectation damages. The secrecy interest therefore
provides another reason that such provisions should be summarily enforced,
at least in transactions between informed transactors.
Once the effect of information revelation on the aggrieved party's
incentive to sue is taken into account, it becomes clear that in a hypothetical
jurisdiction that permitted the summary enforcement of liquidated-damages
provisions, an aggrieved party's expected recovery under a contract with
even an undercompensatory liquidated-damages provision might be greater
than the expected recovery of an aggrieved party who had both a significant
secrecy interest and a legal right to fully compensatory expectation
damages.
It is, however, important to note that liquidated-damages provisions that
are included to protect one or both of the transactors' secrecy interests are
less likely to be bargained around than are liquidated-damages provisions
motivated by the difficulty of proving loss. The process of bargaining may
itself reveal information. As a consequence, if such provisions are set too
high, they are more likely to lead to inefficiently high levels of contractual
performance than are liquidated-damages provisions included for other
reasons. However, this efficiency loss needs to be compared to the
offsetting efficiency gain that results from the potential relationship-
preserving effect of such provisions. The use of a liquidated-damages
provision decreases the likelihood that a repeat-dealing relationship, with its
associated relationship-specific efficiency gains, will end if a dispute arises.
41. The process of negotiating liquidated-damages clauses generally reveals less private
information than the discovery process in a suit for expectation damages. First, even liquidated-
damages provisions that accurately reveal the magnitude of the aggrieved party's expectation
interest do not reveal the underlying information on which it is based, such as detailed cost and
profit data or other potentially valuable qualitative information such as the aggrieved party's
inventory methods, the identity of her buyers, and the identity of and terms offered by other
suppliers. Second, in light of considerations discussed in the text, see supra text accompanying
notes 29-31, any liquidated-damages amount proposed by a promisee would likely be viewed by a
promisor as an unreliable signal of the true quantitative interest of the promisee. Nevertheless. it is
important to note that while the secrecy cost of entering into a liquidated-damages provision is
less than the secrecy cost of litigating expectation damages ex post. the latter cost need be borne
only if the relationship between the transactors breaks down, while the former cost is borne with
certainty. However, because in the absence of the clause the potential aggrieved party has no
credible threat to sue, the likelihood that breach will occur is substantially higher.
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Because the dispute will not require either party to reveal its reservation
price, the parties at least have the opportunity to resume dealing on their
former terms. Moreover, because liquidated-damages provisions are paid
for ex ante by the promisee in the form of higher prices, the efficiency loss
from overdeterred breaches is likely to be small. Promisees are unlikely to




The Code permits the award of specific performance when "the goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances." 43 Although this standard is
more generous than the common-law standard,44 specific performance for
breach of contract remains an uncommon remedy.45
The Code's approach to specific performance is similar to its approach
to liquidated damages in that both are considered proper only when there is
a problem verifying the magnitude of the generally preferred expectation
remedy, either because the valuation required is highly subjective and runs
a high risk of being undercompensatory (as in the case of valuing a family
heirloom with sentimental value) or because it is difficult for a court to
administer since the aggrieved party's losses are difficult or expensive for a
court to calculate.46 Recognizing the secrecy interest, however, suggests
that a breached-against party might seek specific performance, or
transactors might include specific-performance provisions in their contracts,
simply to avoid the revelation of private information if a dispute were to
arise. When specific performance is sought to protect a secrecy interest, it is
desirable not because expectation damages are inaccurate or inadequate, but
rather precisely because they are quite accurate and most likely adequate.
When transactors opt for specific performance to protect a secrecy
interest, however, the remedy is less likely to be bargained around than
when it is sought for the reasons traditionally recognized in the literature.
42. See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 3, at 298-300 (demonstrating that transactors will
never find it desirable to purchase overcompensatory liquidated-damages provisions).
43. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1998).
44. See id. § 2-716 cmt. I ("[T]his Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some
courts have shown in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale.").
45. The proposed Code, however, expands the availability of specific performance. See id.
§ 2-807 cmts. 2, 5 (Proposed Revisions 1999) ("[T]his section recognizes and encourages the
court to enter a specific performance remedy when the parties have agreed to that remedy," but
"[n]othing in this section constrains the court's exercise of its equitable discretion in deciding
whether to enter a decree for specific performance.").
46. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. ScoIr, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 401 (2d ed. 1991) ("[A] buyer will sue for specific performance only when she
believes that her remedy at law would be inadequate: cover and market damages would be
unsatisfactory because the buyer thinks that there are no good substitutes for the seller's
performance, and a suit for lost profits would be unsuccessful.").
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Although bargaining around an order of specific performance may reveal
some information, unlike the information needed to calculate the
expectation measure (which reveals the precise value the aggrieved party
attaches to performance), the information revealed in bargaining around an
order of specific performance is a much noisier signal of her true valuation
because it reflects both her actual subjective valuation and the bargaining
premium that she extracts from the breaching party. This premium, in turn,
depends on the breaching party's benefit from breach and the transactors'
relative bargaining strengths. Furthermore, even when bargaining around
an order of specific performance reveals some information about the
magnitude of the aggrieved party's actual loss, it may at least partially
protect her secrecy interest because it does not require her to reveal any
qualitative business information. Nevertheless, because where a secrecy
interest is sufficiently strong, an order of specific performance is less likely
to be bargained around than it would be in the absence of the interest, the
use of specific performance to protect a secrecy interest may result in some
deadweight losses from excessively high levels of contractual performance.
These losses should, however, be balanced against the welfare gain from
the availability of a secrecy-preserving remedy that maintains the
credibility of the aggrieved party's threat to sue and thereby deters
inefficient breaches.'
C. Capping Contract-Market Damages
The Code gives aggrieved parties the right to recover the contract-
market differential plus certain statutorily specified incidental and
consequential damages. Recently, however, courts have begun to impose an
actual-damages cap on sellers' recovery of the contract-market differential,
and a few courts have, under specified circumstances, imposed actual-
damages caps on buyers' recovery of contract-market damages as well.
This approach is also at the heart of the remedial structure of the proposed
Code, which explicitly imposes an actual-loss cap on all damage
assessments made under its more particular provisions. Like the courts that
have imposed actual-loss caps under the existing Code, the Drafting
47. In general, it has been demonstrated that when bargaining is imperfect and negotiations
might fail due to asymmetric information, the desirability of specific performance (a property
rule) as compared to expectation damages (a liability rule) is diminished. For a general
articulation of this claim, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 715 (1996), which argues that when bargaining
is imperfect, liability rules are superior to property rules because they lead to more efficient
outcomes in situations in which bargaining breakdown in fact occurs. However, it is important to
note that in contracting contexts in which secrecy is important, this result will hold if the liability
rule selected is an objective rule, but is more questionable if a subjective measure is used, since
this in turn may affect the likelihood that suit would be brought.
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Committee justified its approach as being necessary to protect the
compensatory interest embedded in the existing Code's exhortation that
remedies be "liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may
be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.""8
Although the imposition of such caps has been lauded by leading
commentators, 49 the secrecy interest suggests that actual-damages caps are
undesirable. The mere availability of such caps gives the breaching party
the right to obtain additional potentially valuable information through
discovery. As a consequence, even if such caps are in fact rarely imposed
(the situation under the existing Code), the ability of the defendant to obtain
the discovery necessary to establish whether they are warranted will
jeopardize the plaintiff's secrecy interest in a broad range of cases and
might either undermine or completely eliminate the credibility of her threat
to sue.
In order to illustrate the importance of recognizing the secrecy interest
to the desirability of imposing actual-damages limitations, it is useful to
look at the relevant Code and proposed Code sections as well as the cases
that have led courts and commentators to endorse this approach. Ironically,
some leading cases endorsing actual-damages caps are, particularly on the
buyer's side, ones in which a substantial secrecy interest may well have
been present.
1. Sellers' Remedies
Courts imposing an actual-damages cap on sellers' right to contract-
market damages have drawn on a section of the Code that states that when
the contract-market differential is inadequate, the seller may instead
recover his lost profits." Traditionally, this section has been interpreted to
apply only to lost-volume sellers who would be undercompensated by the
48. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1998).
49. See White, supra note 39, at 8, 16 (praising cases imposing actual-loss caps despite the
fact that as a matter of statutory interpretation they represent "a large step beyond the Code's
explicit limitations upon the use of the market model," and suggesting that "it is time to question
the routine acceptance of the market formula" in regular cases); see also id. at 3 (" When we
claim that a plaintiffs true loss is equal to the market formula difference, we are confusing
metaphor for reality. ... The market formula should be rejected as a model where it produces too
great or too little recovery.").
50. The Code states:
If the measure of damages ... is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as
performance would have done then the measure of the damage is the profit (including
reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by the
buyer, together with any incidental damages ... , due allowance for costs reasonably
incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1998).
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contract-market differential." Recently, however, a few courts have held
that a buyer may invoke this section to limit a seller's damages to his actual
lost profit in situations in which contract-market damages would
overcompensate the seller.
One of the leading cases in this area is Nobs Chemical, U.S.A. v.
Koppers Co.52 In Nobs, the plaintiff arranged to purchase a fuel additive
from a supplier (under a requirements contract) for $445 per ton, and
contracted to sell 1000 tons of the additive to Koppers for $540 per ton.
Koppers breached the contract. Nobs reduced its purchases under the
requirements contract and sued Koppers for contract-market damages.
Because the market had significantly declined, the contract-market
differential could have been as high as $320,000, while actual lost profit,
calculated on the basis of the $95 profit per ton, would have been only
$95,000. The court limited Nobs's recovery to its lost profit, explaining that
the remedial goal of full compensation-as articulated in the Code and as
reflected in Texas case law-was a "strong factor weighing against" the
award of contract-market damages.53 The court held that the Code provision
permitting a lost profit measure to be used when the contract-market
differential was inadequate applied equally to situations where the measure
was either over- or undercompensatory.'
In the context described in Nobs, however, an aggrieved seller may
have a secrecy interest in keeping the information necessary to determine
his actual loss private. In particular, a seller may not want a buyer to know
his source of supply and whether he is a middleman, a true supplier, or
both. Supporters of imposing an actual-damages cap, however, think that
this is precisely the type of information that should be used to determine
whether the cap should be applied in a particular case. Indeed, White and
Summers, two leading proponents of actual-loss caps, " caution courts to
51. A plaintiff with a secrecy interest may also be reluctant to claim lost-volume seller status
because establishing her lost-volume status will require her to reveal detailed information about
her cost structure. See RE. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics. Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 684 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that a plaintiff seeking to establish itself as a lost-volume seller must show "not
only that it had the capacity to produce the breached unit in addition to the unit resold, but also
that it would have been profitable for it to have produced and sold both units").
52. 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 618 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Union
Carbide Corp. v. Consumers Power Co., 636 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (imposing an
actual-loss cap on a claim for contract-market damages, explaining that "madequate' should
be interpreted to mean incapable or inadequate to accomplish the stated purpose of the UCC
remedies of compensating the aggrieved person but not overcompensating that person or specially
punishing the other person").
53. Nobs, 616 F.2d at 215-16.
54. This interpretation of the "inadequate" language in 2-708(2). see supra note 50, is
endorsed by 1 JAMES J. WHrrm & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CONM]ERCIAL CODE 394 (4th
ed. 1995): "[Ihe defendant should be permitted to restrict the plaintiff to ... [an actual damages
limitation] in those circumstances in which the defendant buyer can show that... (the award of
the contract-market differential] will overcompensate the plaintiff."
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analyze all the circumstances surrounding the transaction"55 before making
such a determination. If such an approach were adopted, however, the
contract-market differential would be transformed into a subjective measure
of damages that, even under a more restrictive discovery regime, could not
be used to provide a safe harbor to transactors who wished to protect
private information.
2. Buyers' Remedies
Most courts do not impose an actual-loss cap on buyers' right to obtain
contract-market damages. Recently, however, some courts have begun to
impose such a limitation, primarily in situations involving middleman
buyers who have contracted to buy goods and resell them to an identified
buyer. Curiously, these are situations in which the aggrieved party's secrecy
interest is likely to be particularly strong.
In the first case, Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing
Co.,56 an aggrieved middleman buyer sought contract-market damages for
breach of a contract to deliver raisins. The court, however, limited his
recovery to the profit he would have made under his existing resale
contract. The court explained that because a flood had damaged the relevant
raisin crop, legally excusing the middleman from his obligations to his
identified buyer under the doctrine of force majeure, awarding his lost
resale profit would be fully compensatory and would prevent him from
obtaining a windfall under the contract-market measure. Curiously, the
Allied court explicitly recognized the middleman buyer's secrecy interest,
noting that it was the practice of the government raisin authority, which
played a role in the administration of these contracts, to "keep[ ] the name
of the foreign importer [the middleman's buyer] confidential, as frequently
the exporter, in order to protect his business sources, does not want the
packer [the original seller] to have that information."5 " Yet, in order to
apply the court's criteria for deciding whether an actual-loss cap should be
imposed, and, if so, what the resale profit would have been, this is precisely
55. 1 id. at 398. In addition, in discussing Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769
F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1985), a leading case that refuses to impose an actual-loss cap on sellers'
damages, White and Summers explain that they cannot take a definitive position on the wisdom of
the holding, because the information they would need to determine if the case was rightly
decided-such as "whether the seller is a manufacturer or merely a middleman ... [and] what
arrangements the seller had with upstream suppliers"-was unavailable. I WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 54, at 397. This, however, is precisely the sort of information that an aggrieved party
with a secrecy interest would want to keep private.
56. 209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1984).
57. Making a seller's liability for breach turn on whether a buyer has a contract for resale
may encourage a seller to breach a contract with a buyer in order to get this information and sell
directly to the buyer's customer in the future.
58. Allied, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
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the information that the aggrieved party would have to reveal during
discovery.
In the other leading case, H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder,59 the court
capped a middleman cattle broker's damages at the amount he would
have realized on resale, explaining that the award of contract-market
damages would give the plaintiff a "windfall" and would "violate the
general principle concerning remedies underlying Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code." 6° Although the middleman explained that his true
damages would be higher since he would be liable for breaching his
contract with his end-purchaser, the court rejected this argument, noting
that because the end-purchaser had not demanded performance or sued, it
was improper to take this into account.
The willingness of courts to impose actual-loss caps on aggrieved
middleman buyers is particularly curious since middleman buyers tend to
have extraordinarily strong secrecy interests. If a middleman's supplier
learns the terms on which the middleman sells to her customers, the
supplier will have a good idea of her reservation price and may be able to
extract a far higher portion of the middleman's consumer surplus than it
would without the information. In addition, in markets where sellers engage
in both direct and middleman or broker-mediated sales, there is nothing to
stop the seller from selling directly to the middleman's customers once their
identity (and the price they are willing to pay) is revealed.6' A middleman's
customer list is a valuable business asset.
Moreover, the doctrines articulated in these cases require a
determination of how a seller's breach affected contracts that the aggrieved
buyer had with third parties. In making this determination, however, courts
have ignored important relational elements of these exchanges. In Allied,
for example, the court noted that the middleman's identified buyer
"demanded delivery," but held that because the middleman's obligation to
deliver under its contract with its buyer was excused by the doctrine of
force majeure and the buyer never sued, no damages were suffered by the
middleman as a result of breach.62 However, the fact that legal liability was
59. 767 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1985).
60. Id. at439-40.
61. The holdings in Allied and H-W.H may also have disproportionately bad effects on
smaller middlemen, who are more likely to identify goods to a contract, as compared to larger
middlemen who may have larger inventories or a greater number of suppliers and buyers and who
therefore are more likely to be awarded contract-market damages.
62. The mere fact that a party is legally excused from performance does not mean that
nonperformance is costless. For example, most grain contracts have generous force majeure
provisions, yet grain merchants are extraordinarily reluctant to invoke them. In the mid-1990s,
large portions of the Mississippi River froze and halted barge traffic. Nevertheless, most sellers,
with the notable exception of one large company, did not avail themselves of the excuse. The one
company that declared force majeure and used it as an excuse not to deliver found that many
people in the market would no longer do barge-related business with it and the firm's
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not incurred does not mean that harm was not suffered. Indeed, in Allied,
the middleman buyer testified at trial that "it had suffered additional
consequential damages through the loss of the entire account"63 with its
buyer. Similarly, in H-W-H, the court recognized the unusual fact that the
middleman and the end user were owned by the same parent company. It
did not, however, consider the possibility that this relationship, rather than
the absence of a true loss, might well account for the fact that performance
was not demanded and suit was not filed.
In sum, although cases imposing actual-loss caps have generally
been lauded by commentators, 64 while those that have refused to impose
such limitations65 have generally been criticized in the commercial law
literature,66 recognizing the secrecy interest suggests an additional reason
why actual-loss caps, even when sparingly imposed by courts, are
undesirable.
3. The New Remedial Hierarchy in the Proposed Code
The remedial hierarchy in the proposed Code includes a wide-ranging
actual-damages limitation. Its official comments explicitly reject the logic
of the cases refusing to impose actual-loss caps and transform the
compensation principle into an overarching principle of damages
calculation. As the official comment to the section of the proposed Code
that embodies the full compensation principle of the existing Code states,
this section "sets forth remedial policies that control the applications of the
representatives were widely ridiculed at the next year's trade meeting. See Interview with Grain
Industry Executive (1995).
63. Allied, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 66 n.8.
64. See I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, at 394 ("We are at least tentatively persuaded
that Allied and H-W-H should be followed, but that Courts should take care to apply ... [both]
narrowly."). See generally White, supra note 39 (endorsing the outcome in these cases).
65. The leading case refusing to impose an actual-damages limitation is Tongish v. Thomas,
829 P.2d 916, 919 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992), in which the court refused to use the general language of
section 1-106 to impose an actual-loss cap, explaining that "[w]hen there is a conflict between a
statute dealing generally with a subject and another statute dealing specifically with a certain
phase of it, the specific statute controls unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the
general act controlling."
66. See, e.g., Roy Ryden Anderson, Damage Remedies Under the Emerging Article 2-An
Essay Against Freedom, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1065, 1109 (1997) (critiquing the holding in Tongish
as "read[ing] section 1-106 entirely out of the Code"); Michael T. Gibson, Reliance Damages in
the Law of Sales Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909. 924
n.70 (1997) (suggesting that U.C.C. § 1-106's protection of the expectation interest is a mandatory
rule and that Tongish was wrongly decided because the court "ignored section 1- 102's command
to use its purposes when interpreting more 'specific' Code sections, a command which overrides
the traditional rule" of statutory interpretation). But see David W. Carroll, A Little Essay in
Partial Defense of the Contract-Market Differential as a Remedy for Buyers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
667, 668 (1984) (defending the contract-market measure on the grounds that in almost all
instances it provides an accurate compensatory remedy).
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more specific remedial rules,"'67 which set out the buyer's and seller's
remedies.
By elevating the compensatory interest to an overriding principle of
damage calculation, the proposed Code opens up virtually all remedies to
a defendant's claim that a particular plaintiff's recovery would be
overcompensatory and thus should be reduced.s It thereby transforms
contract-market damages from an objective remedy that might be invoked
to protect an aggrieved party's secrecy interest into a subjective remedy that
permits a breaching party to obtain wide-ranging firm-specific information
during the discovery process.
The proposed Code also eliminates the imperfect yet significant secrecy
benefits of seeking restitution damages. As the official comments note, "An
aggrieved party should not be able to.. . recover damages based upon its
reliance or restitutionary interests when those interests are greater than its
expectancy interest., 69 Because this limitation entitles the defendant to
obtain the information necessary to calculate expectation damages, it has
the same effect on the aggrieved party's litigation choices as an actual-loss
cap. It therefore transforms restitution damages into a subjective damage
measure and would make it even more difficult to transform reliance
damages into a quasi-objective remedy.
D. Cover
The Code provisions and common-law doctrines relating to cover are
among the least criticized principles of contract remedies. Under the Code,
an aggrieved buyer is forced to make an election of remedies. She can
cover-that is, buy substitute goods, and seek damages in an amount equal
to the contract-cover differential plus incidental damages "less expenses
67. U.C.C. § 2-801 cmt. 2 (Proposed Revisions 1999) (emphasis added). see also id. § 2-803
cmt. 3 ("The specific remedies ... are designed to compensate the aggrieved party based upon its
expectation interest."). This language squarely rejects the logic used in cases refusing to impose a
cap such as Tongish. See also Memorandum from Richard E. Speidel to Article 2 Drafting
Committee, ALI Sales Subgroup (Mar. 1. 1997) (on file with the authors) (strongly suggesting
that preventing ex post overcompensation is a major goal of the revision). The move toward
limiting damages to an aggrieved party's actual loss was even more unmistakably expressed in
earlier drafts of the Proposed Code. See U.C.C. § 2-803(c) (Discussion Draft Apr. 14, 1997) (" [A]
court may deny or limit a remedy if, under the circumstances, it would put the aggrieved party in a
substantially better position than if the breaching party had fully performed.").
68. The proposed Code's provision on consequential damages gives the breaching party an
additional ground on which to challenge the magnitude of the aggrieved party's damages, thereby
even further broadening the information the breaching party is entitled to obtain. See U.C.C. § 2-
806 cmt. 4 (Proposed Revisions 1999) (providing that it is proper - to limit consequential damages
if under the circumstances 'justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation"
(citations omitted)).
69. Id. § 2-804 cmt. 3.
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saved in consequence of the seller's breach" 70 -or she can seek contract-
market damages71 plus certain incidental and consequential damages.7
Whether a plaintiff has adequately covered is a question of fact. 3 In
cases in which an aggrieved buyer has in fact covered, proving that she did
so in an appropriate manner requires her to reveal a great deal of private
information. Establishing whether cover has taken place necessitates an
inquiry into many of the transactions that the aggrieved party entered into
immediately following breach. It may also require her to reveal sensitive
business or market information,74 the identity of the next lowest cost
supplier and the price at which he is willing to sell, as well as the identity
and price charged by a large number of other market participants.75 Indeed,
White and Summers advise a breached-against buyer to "build a record that
shows he made reasonable inquiries of alternative sources of supply before
making his cover purchases. ' 76 This, however, is precisely the type of
information that the aggrieved party would prefer to keep private, since it
might well reveal her reservation price.
It is also important to note that even when the aggrieved party elects not
to cover, the Code provision on cover might jeopardize the aggrieved
party's secrecy interest, albeit to a lesser extent. In such a situation, the
breaching party, in an attempt to limit his damages, still has the right to
inquire into the extent of the aggrieved party's search for cover and to
attempt to demonstrate that the aggrieved party in fact covered. And, in an
70. U.C.C. § 2-712(2) (1998).
71. See id. § 2-713.
72. See id. § 2-715. The Code's official comments make it clear that the contract-market
measure is "completely alternative to cover... and applies only when and to the extent that the
buyer has not covered." Id. § 2-713 cmt. 5. The exclusivity of the cover remedy was, after a
lengthy debate, explicitly endorsed in the proposed Code. See U.C.C. § 2-803 cmt. 4 (Proposed
Revisions 1999).
73. See Transammonia Export Corp. v. Conserv, Inc., 554 F.2d 719, 724 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[W]hether a plaintiff has made his cover purchases in a reasonable manner poses a 'classic jury
issue'.").
74. This is particularly true since the Staggers Act of 1980 deregulated rail tariffs. See
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895. Buyers of cash commodities, for
example, often negotiate secret rate discounts with Railroads. See Interview with Grain Merchant
(1998). In contracts in which the buyer pays the freight, if the seller knew the content of these
special deals, he might be able to extract more of the buyer's consumer surplus. These rate
agreements tend to be for months at a time, so revealing them could be quite costly. Because a
plaintiff's recovery of the contract-cover differential is reduced by costs saved in consequence of
a seller's breach and transportation costs are one of the most common costs saved, see Michael F.
Quinn, Remedies, in BASIC U.C.C. SKILLS 1989: ARTICLE 2, at 41, 78 (PLI Commercial &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 502, 1989), a seller would likely seek discovery of these
and related costs.
75. She might also be required to reveal how wide her search of the relevant market was. See
Productora e Importadora de Papel S.A. de C.V. v. Fleming, 383 N.E.2d 1129, 1137-38 (Mass.
1978) (holding that it was error for the court below to exclude evidence of whether, in addition to
its "regular suppliers," other major brokers in the industry were contacted to try to procure
cover).
76. 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, at 288.
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effort to establish this claim, he has the right to obtain discovery on many
aspects of the breached-against party's business-among them the identity
of her other suppliers, the quantities she bought from each in the relevant
period together with the price paid, and the amount of inventory she
typically carried. ' The mere availability of the cover remedy may therefore
discourage an aggrieved party from filing suit to recover even the objective
contract-market differential, even though measuring the contract-market
differential itself does not require the revelation of information.
E. Mitigation
Although the doctrine of mitigation has also escaped serious criticism,"
it too may jeopardize the aggrieved party's secrecy interest. A defendant
attempting to establish that a plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages is
permitted to take broad discovery of numerous documents and information
that plaintiffs often have a substantial interest in keeping private. As a
leading treatise on the recovery of damages for lost profit explains, a
defendant's first round of interrogatories related to mitigation should
demand that the plaintiff
[i]dentify each and every source of income derived by you during
the period of time you claim or contend that you suffered the
damages alleged. As to each source of income, include in your
answer: (a) Whether the income was derived pursuant to a written
contract, and, if so, the name and address of the custodian of the
contract; (b) Whether the income was derived pursuant to an oral
77. This problem is likely to be particularly acute in situations in which the aggrieved buyers
purchase from many sellers. Because an aggrieved buyer may call a purchase of a particular lot
"cover" or "not cover," a defendant-seller attempting to rebut this assertion would likely have
access to the buyer's internal allocation, accounting, and inventory systems, all of which may
contain valuable information about her vulnerability to holdup. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co. v.
Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting, in a dispute as to whether the
seller's ability to elect damages based on the resale-contract differential was capped by the seller's
actual loss, that information about the identity of those the seller resold to around the date of
resale, the name of its purchasers, the price, and the amount sold had been introduced into the
record at trial). In addition, Michael Quinn notes,
If buyer purchases the same goods from many sellers on a regular basis and one seller
breaches, it may be difficult to ascertain which subsequent contract buyer entered into
to purchase goods in substitution for the goods which the seller failed to supply.... If
the matter proceeds to litigation, seller is well advised to make sure he discovers
information relating to all of buyer's post-breach purchases. Hopefully, he will be able
to uncover a purchase by buyer at or near the contract price which occurred soon after
the seller's breach which he can argue is the cover purchase from which damages must
be measured.
Quinn, supra note 74, at 75-76.
78. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 967 (1983) ("The duty to mitigate is a
universally accepted principle of contract law requiring that each party exert reasonable efforts to
minimize losses whenever intervening events impede contractual objectives.").
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contract, and, if so, the terms and conditions of the oral contract; (c)
The amount of income derived; (d) The date or dates such income
was derived; and (e) The nature of the services rendered by him as
consideration for the income, and the dates during which the
services were performed.79
Since the duty to mitigate applies to all contractual relationships and
exists even where the breached-against party has elected not to cover,80 it,
too, may greatly undermine the credibility of an aggrieved party's threat to
sue. This suggests that in a regime in which truly objective damages were
available, it would be desirable either to eliminate the duty to mitigate or to
give summary enforcement to contract clauses waiving the duty. Unlike in a
regime of subjective damages where eliminating the duty might lead to
suboptimal amounts of actual mitigation, in a regime of objective damages,
such a change will not lead to suboptimal amounts of mitigation, and might
even lead to more efficient mitigation. 8' When an aggrieved party knows
that her recoverable damages will be limited to the objectively determined
amount and will not be reduced if actual losses are avoided or increased if
additional losses are incurred, she will have the optimal incentive to
mitigate. Because the aggrieved party gets the full benefit of any losses she
avoids and bears the full cost of taking actions to avoid losses, she will only
take actions in mitigation whose costs are less than their benefits, precisely
the actions that it is efficient for her to take.
F. Other Doctrines and Concerns
Although this Essay has focused on the ways that recognizing the
secrecy interest affects the desirability of various Code and common-law
79. 2 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 718 (5th ed. 1998). In
addition, practice manuals suggest that a manufacturer-plaintiff's fixed costs-which may include
"such items as materials purchased for use on a number of products or production units, costs of
energy or other plant operation expenses... that can be reallocated, and wages or salaries of
personnel whose labor can be relocated" -should be "searched out and identified," by a
defendant attempting to show lack of mitigation. Richard C. Tinney, Reduction or Mitigation of
Damages: Sales Contract, in I 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 131, 245 (1976).
80. For a discussion of when a failure to cover is considered to be a failure to mitigate losses,
see I WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, and sources cited therein.
81. A subjective damage measure with a duty to mitigate may lead to less mitigation than
would an objective measure with no duty to mitigate. In practice, courts construing the contours of
the duty to mitigate are generous to the aggrieved party. As a consequence, an aggrieved party
knows that if her losses increase because she failed to take certain steps in mitigation. she may
well be compensated for these losses. In contrast, under an objective damage rule with no
mitigation requirement, she knows she will bear the full cost of any losses not avoided. See Robert
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. I. 15
(1985) (demonstrating that damages calculated on the basis of the contract-market differential
provide the promisee with efficient incentives to rely and to mitigate damages): Epstein. supra
note 38, at 134.
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remedial provisions, it also has implications for a number of other
doctrines. Because some of these doctrines require the revelation of private
information and impose essentially nonwaivable constraints on transactors,
recognizing the secrecy interest suggests additional considerations that
ought to be taken into account in evaluating the desirability of these
doctrines.
One such doctrine is substantial performance. Once a defendant is
entitled to the information to establish whether or not a breach is material,
the plaintiff's secrecy interest is seriously jeopardized. Similar problems
arise in the Code's approach to nonconforming tender. The Code has
technically preserved the perfect-tender rule. 2 However, when the tender
provisions are read together with other Code provisions, it is generally
recogfiized that something closer to the doctrine of substantial performance
with a price adjustment is the dominant rule. 3 As a consequence, in
contracting contexts in which the revelation of the information needed to
impose the appropriate price adjustment threatens to undermine the
aggrieved party's secrecy interest, recognizing the existence of the interest
suggests that greater adherence to the perfect-tender rule might be
advisable.'
It is also important to consider the effects of the Code provision giving
contracting parties the right to demand adequate assurances of performance
and to treat a contract as repudiated if the assurances are not forthcoming.'s
In certain contexts, this provision actually heightens the importance of the
breaching party's and/or the aggrieved party's secrecy interests. Consider,
82. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1998) (providing that the buyer may reject goods if "the goods or
the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract").
83. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, at 439-45 (discussing the Code's tender-related
provisions and concluding that "the cases decided to date suggest, that the Code changes [from
the common law] and the courts' manipulation have so eroded the perfect tender rule that the
law would be little changed if [the Code] gave the right to reject only upon 'substantial'
nonconformity").
84. This problem is also present to an even greater extent in the Code provision on
installment sales, U.C.C. § 2-612 (1998).
85. See id. § 2-609. The goal of U.C.C. § 2-609 is to help promisces maintain the level of
financial risk they assumed when they entered into a contract. As the official comment explains.
mhe section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential purpose of a contract
between commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a
promise or for a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit and that a continuing sense of
reliance and security that the promised performance will be forthcoming when due, is
an important feature of the bargain.
Id. § 2-609 cmt 2. Recognizing the secrecy interest, however, suggests that while the provision
may help promisees protect themselves when a firm's financial position declines, it may also have
the effect of discouraging firms from bringing lawsuits with a positive expected return, even
though doing so makes the firm's promisees better off by adding money to the corporate coffers.
However, when the filing of suit reveals information that will result in the firm facing expensive
demands for adequate assurances of performance from nonparties to the suit. see id. § 2.609 cmi.
3, such as the posting of bonds and escrows, the entity may choose to forgo the suit since the
giving of the assurances is so costly, thereby reducing the pool of assets available to satisfy the
firm's creditors.
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for example, a quality-related dispute between a seller of a component part
and a buyer who uses that part to manufacture a complex good. In such a
situation, a buyer who files suit and reveals the problem during discovery
might immediately face Code-justified demands for adequate assurances of
performance from suppliers of other components (who fear that delay in
getting the assembled product to market may result in buyer-side financial
distress) and from any people who placed orders for the product the buyer
was manufacturing. The official comments to this section explain that "a
ground for insecurity need not arise from or be directly related to the
contract in question." 86 As a consequence, the potential secrecy-related cost
of the right to demand these assurances is likely to be significant, because
the higher the aggrieved party asserts its damages to be, the more legitimate
are the demands others might make of it for adequate assurances. In
addition, the seller may also have a secrecy interest in keeping quality-
related information from the market. As the official comments explain,
"[A] buyer who requires precision parts which he intends to use
immediately upon delivery, may have reasonable grounds for insecurity if
he discovers that his seller is making defective deliveries to other buyers
with similar needs." 87 This suggests that a seller may face demands for
assurances from other buyers if quality-related information is revealed
during a dispute.
The Code is rather vague as to what constitutes adequate assurances,
but it appears to give the party giving the assurances the right to determine
the form they should take. According to a leading commentator, however,
[i]n practice.., the courts tend to view the demand made by the
promisee as the focal point for considering adequacy, and a
promisor is ill-counseled to vary the assurance demanded if it does
not exceed the minimum kind of guarantee necessary to relieve the
promisee's anxiety concerning performance. 8
Common types of assurances include "accommodation notes, escrow
accounts, or proof that the buyer's financial condition is not as bad as
suspected."89 Whether a particular response is adequate in a given situation
depends strongly on the financial position of the person giving the
assurances and the details of the business operations of the person receiving
86. Id. § 2-609 cmt. 3.
87. Id. § 2-609 cmt. 2.
88. 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-609:3 (1998).
89. 2 id. The effects of this Code provision are further exacerbated by the requirement that
the assurances be given "within a reasonable time not exceeding 30 days." U.C.C. § 2-609(4)
(1998).
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them. As a consequence, making this determination is likely to require the
revelation of a great deal of information.'
G. Toward a (Potentially) Secrecy-Preserving Remedial Regime
Broadly speaking, recognizing the ways that an aggrieved party's
secrecy interest might affect her contracting and litigation-related behavior
in a jurisdiction with liberal rules of discovery suggests that the remedial
provisions of the Code are not pure default rules. While transactors can
draft provisions that, within certain bounds, affect the magnitude of a
damage award, they are manifestly not free to contract for the mix of
monetary damages and ex post information revelation that they find
desirable. In practice, the scrutiny of liquidated-damages provisions, the
tests for specific performance, and the availability of actual-damage caps,
as well as the nonwaivable doctrines of cover and mitigation, together with
various performance-related doctrines, make the form of the remedy a
quasi-mandatory rule and wholly prevent transactors from contracting for
an objective measure of damages, even when doing so would leave them
both better off.
A legal regime that prevents transactors from contracting for objective
damage measures or liquidated damages free of ex post judicial scrutiny,
together with the types of broad ranging discovery permitted in most
American jurisdictions, leads to significant social costs. Consider a buyer
with a secrecy interest who is negotiating with a seller. If the buyer cannot
protect her secrecy interest through an objective damage remedy, this will
affect the likelihood that the transaction will be consummated as well as the
terms and conditions selected. First, if the secrecy interest is large, the
buyer might forgo the transaction entirely. The nonavailability of an
objective damage measure makes certain types of commitments non-
contractible. A manufacturer may, for example, decide to produce certain
component parts in-house rather than risk secrecy-compromising lawsuits
with her suppliers. Alternatively, she may enter into a staggered series of
short-term exchanges rather than a long-term contract with its associated
efficiency gains, in order to reduce her vulnerability to any one breach.
Second, the buyer may require a price reduction up front to make it
worthwhile to take the risk that the seller will breach. Third, other complex
and, most likely, excessively costly, contractual arrangements may be
employed to attempt to contract around the problems created by these
90. "For example, where the buyer can make use of a defective delivery, a mere promise by a
seller of good repute that he is giving the matter his attention and that the defect will not be
repeated is normally sufficient." U.C.C § 2-609 cmt 4. Applying this section, however. requires
the buyer to reveal whether he can make any use of defective delivery, something he may well
want to keep private since revealing it may lead the seller to behave opportunistically.
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limitations. Fourth, limitations on the availability of objective damage
measures and the inability of transactors to limit discovery may provide a
reason for transactors to contract for arbitration,9" or markets to opt out of
the public legal system. Fifth, in situations in which an aggrieved party
91. In general, a desire to keep proceedings private is an important reason that transactors opt
for alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The press and other members of the public who have
wide access to judicial proceedings have no right to attend private ADR proceedings. In fact,
advertisements for private ADR providers tend to emphasize secrecy. See Gail Diane Cox, The
Best Judges Money Can Buy, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1987, at I, 24 (stating that, according to the
president of Judicate, then a leading ADR provider, "[c]onfidentiality is part of what his finn
sells"). The American Arbitration Association (AAA), one of the largest providers of general
commercial arbitration services, directs its arbitrators to render a judgment in the form of a
nonpublic award that contains no findings of fact or statements of law. See AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, R. 42-45 (1993). However, the AAA
does recommend that its arbitrators itemize their award of damages if either party so requests, a
practice that itself jeopardizes the secrecy interest. See AAA GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATORS 23 (1999). In addition, nothing prevents a party to an arbitration from sharing what
it has learned with other market participants.
Under current law, the extent to which transactors can constrain arbitrators' damages
calculations by contract in ways that conflict with the background legal rules is unclear.
particularly when these rules are mandatory rather than default, such as the rule that liquidated
damages are invalid if they are found to be penalties. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL.,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, ch. 36 (1994). However, judicial review of decisions applying
remedies that conflict with the law is quite lax. For example, in Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris
Construction Corp., 168 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1960), the court upheld an AAA arbitration award
ordering specific performance of a construction contract even though in the court's view a court
might not have entered such an award. See id. at 379-80. The court explained that the AAA rules
specifically authorized specific performance so that to overturn their award would "frustrate the
whole arbitration process." Id. at 379; see also Steven J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory
Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999) (discussing the extent
to which substantive law can be privatized through arbitration).
The extent to which parties can contract to limit discovery in arbitration is also quite unclear,
as there are three methods through which information is disclosed in arbitration: "by voluntary
exchange, by order of the arbitrators, and, in rare cases, by order of the court directly at the
request of a party." MACNEIL ET AL., supra, § 34.1. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7
(1994), and the UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7(a), 7 U.L.A. 199 (1997) both give arbitrators the
authority to order discovery on their own initiative if they think it is relevant to the dispute, and
many state statutes give them broad rights of discovery as well. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
9(b) (Supp. 1999). In addition, at least under the Federal Arbitration Act, courts are reluctant to
limit discovery too much. See, e.g., Chevron Transp. Corp. v. Astro Vencedor Compania Naviera,
300 F. Supp. 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that where one party had limited access to some
documents, the fact that the Federal Arbitration Act did not set out specific discovery rules did
"not negate the affirmative duty of arbitrators to insure that relevant documentary evidence in the
hands of one party is fully and timely made available to the other side before the hearing is
closed"). For an overview of federal law on the subject, with sporadic references to state law, see
MACNEIL ET AL., supra, ch. 34. Given these limitations, the extent to which parties can get around
secrecy-related problems by providing for arbitration in their contract is unclear.
The substantive and procedural rules of industry-specific arbitration tribunals, such as the
rules of the Memphis Cotton Exchange, the National Grain and Feed Association, and the
American Fats and Oils Association, however, often limit remedies and provide very limited
party-initiated discovery. They are able to do this as a practical matter not because it is clearly
authorized by the law, but rather because there are reputational considerations that make even
losing parties reluctant to challenge the decisions of these tribunals in court. For a discussion of
the reputational forces that prevent such challenges in one industry, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115, 138-43 (1992).
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knows that she will not find it desirable to sue in the event of breach, she
will reduce her relationship-specific reliance investments. Finally, when
objective damage remedies are unavailable, transactors may only be willing
to do business with people about whose commercial reputation they have
good information, or people upon whom they can impose significant
nonlegal sanctions in the event of breach. This is likely to lead to each
transactor having a suboptimal number of trading partners.
The existence of these costs suggests an additional reason that the law
should be amended to give transactors the ability to opt out of the
expectation measure by contracting ex ante for either a liquidated-damages
provision that will receive no ex post scrutiny or a contract-market measure
of damages that will be calculated without reference to actual loss,? even
though, as many courts and commentators have suggested, the contract-
market measure serves the goal of full compensation "only by the sheerest
of accidents."93
It is also important to note, however, that making truly objective
contract-market damages available would also require additional
substantive and procedural changes. On the substantive side, it would
require making the presence or absence of a cover transaction irrelevant
to the right to obtain contract-market damages, eliminating the duty
to mitigate, eliminating the right to demand adequate assurances
of performance, and perhaps changing certain performance-related
obligations. On the procedural side, it would require making damages-
related discovery unavailable to a defendant when objective damages are
selected. Although such changes might create an increased risk that some
aggrieved parties will be overcompensated, recognition of the secrecy
interest suggests that this risk needs to be weighed against the currently
unrecognized risk of undercompensation created by the availability of
subjective damage measures and the liberal rules of civil discovery.
92. This reason for maintaining the aggrieved party's right to elect contract-market damages
differs from the reasons typically found in the literature:
[A] variety of arguments have been employed by commentators and courts to justify
[the contract-market measure]: the desirability of maintaining a uniform rule and of
facilitating settlements; the public interest in encouraging contract performance and the
proper functioning of the market; the prevention of defendant's unjust enrichment; the
restoration of the very "value" promised to the plaintiff, and the inherent difficulty and
complexity of proving actual economic losses not encompassed within the contract
terms.
David Simon & Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A
Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts. 92 HARV. L REV. 1395. 1403 (1979)
(footnotes omitted).
93. Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two. 73 YALE LJ. 199, 259 (1963); see
also White, supra note 39, at 2 & n.6 ("It is now commonplace for commentators and courts to
acknowledge that the [contract-market] formula does not put the plaintiff in the same position as
performance would have .... "). But see Carroll, supra note 66. at 667-68.
2000] 1919
The Yale Law Journal
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADJUDICATIVE PROCEDURE
In order to fully understand the implications of recognizing the secrecy
interest, it is also important to recognize that the liberal rules of civil
discovery in effect in most American jurisdictions are at least partly
responsible for the undesirable effects of subjective damage measures. It is
therefore useful to explore the ways that discovery rules might be changed,
or other adjudicative rules and procedures altered, to alleviate the secrecy-
related problems created by the substantive content of commercial law.
A. Delay
Recognizing the secrecy interest suggests that delay in the litigation
process may not be entirely undesirable. Although the time value of money,
the natural spoliation of evidence, and the fact that the aggrieved party may
not have access to capital on reasonable terms during the pendency of a
dispute all make delay detrimental to the aggrieved party, in situations in
which her secrecy interest is time-dependent, certain types of delay may
be highly advantageous and indeed lead her to obtain a more nearly
compensatory recovery than she would if adjudication were immediate.
However, since it is the information revealed during discovery that
undermines the secrecy interest, delay in trial is only beneficial if there is a
delay in the initiation of the discovery process as well. This suggests that
while early discovery may promote settlement by giving the parties a
clearer sense of the bargaining range, there are some instances in which
delay in the initiation of discovery may be advantageous and may help
ensure that any settlement reached more nearly compensates the aggrieved
party for her loss.
It is important to note, however, that in situations in which the
aggrieved party has access to capital on reasonable terms and the relevant
evidence is not too susceptible to spoliation, the undesirable effects of the
Code's substantive provisions and the rules governing discovery and
disclosure are at least partially offset by the fact that the Code's statute of
limitations gives the breached-against party four years from the time of the
breach to file suit.94 Four years may be long enough for most secrecy
concerns relating to the underlying transaction to become inconsequential. 5
94. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1998).
95. However, it is also important to note that because delay also favors the defendant, the
effect of using the limitations period is to decrease the breaching party's expected liability (due to
the time value of money) and hence to increase his incentive to inefficiently breach.
1920 [Vol. 109: 1885
The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law
B. Pleading Reform
One procedural change that would enable a plaintiff to better protect
her secrecy interest would be to permit her to limit the types of damages she
requests in her pleadings in a way that would limit the type of damages-
related information the defendant could obtain through discovery. This is
something that it is not possible to do under current law. If such a change
were adopted, the message sent by, for example, failing to request lost
profits, would be quite difficult to decode. It might mean that the profit to
be recovered was small in relation to the value of some industrial
information that would be revealed, or it might mean that it was high and
the plaintiff did not want to reveal it for fear of having to pay a higher price
in future negotiating rounds.
The main substantive obstacles to such a reform, however, are, as
discussed earlier, the remedial doctrines of mitigation and cover. Since the
burden of proving mitigation or that the plaintiff in fact covered rests on the
defendant, he is entitled to get broad discovery about the plaintiffs actions
in order to establish these claims.
C. Special Masters and Discovery
In contracting contexts in which a secrecy interest is substantial, it
could be at least partially protected and the goal of full compensation more
nearly achieved, if transactors could contract in advance for a quasi-
inquisitorial procedure in which a designated special master would
determine the amount of damages, if any, to be awarded in the event of
breach. The special master could be given the authority to obtain the
relevant information from each party and to make an award on the basis
of this information without making the information itself available to
the parties. Although the accuracy benefits of party-conducted cross-
examination would be lost and the special master's award would reveal the
total magnitude of the aggrieved party's damages, such a procedure would
ensure that the content of sensitive business information would not be
revealed. It would therefore partially protect a secrecy interest in the
components of an aggrieved party's reservation price and more completely
protect her interest in other types of proprietary information. Using such a
special master to determine damages in an inquisitorial way has several
additional benefits. First, if the special master is knowledgeable about the
industry, his award may be more accurate than that of a judge or jury.
Second, if he is called on to calculate damages only after liability has been
established, the general benefits of bifurcation-avoiding the expense of the
damages phase not only of trial but also of discovery when liability is not
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found-can be obtained.96 Finally, avoiding party-initiated discovery on the
subject of damages is likely to substantially reduce the cost of disputing.
D. Protective Orders
Another way to partially protect the secrecy interest is to broaden the
availability of so-called "lawyers' eyes only" protective orders, which
permit only the opposing party's lawyer, and experts who need the
information in order to render an opinion to see it.97 Although these orders
are not altogether uncommon, it is difficult to predict when they will be
granted. As a consequence, it might be desirable to adopt more precise
procedural rules that would enable parties to predict when such orders
would be granted. This might, in turn, lead plaintiffs with a secrecy interest
to file suit in some cases where under existing rules they would not.
Alternatively, amending procedural rules to permit transactors to include a
summarily enforceable clause in their contract providing that all damages
information in any suit on the contract would be subject to these orders,
would restore the threat of a potentially aggrieved party to sue and result in
96. For a discussion of the possible benefits and costs of bifurcation, see William M. Landes,
Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (1993).
Bifurcation may also help partially protect some secrecy interests. A plaintiff might, for example.
be willing to forgo her secrecy interest if she knew she would prevail on liability, but might not be
willing to do so before she knew whether or not she would prevail. In certain types of intellectual
property disputes where the calculation of damages typically involves the revelation of
information that might be used against the plaintiff by the defendant or other parties, courts often
grant bifurcation. See, e.g., Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 20 F.R.D. 31, 31-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(granting the defendants' motion to stay damage-related discovery in "an action for copyright
infringement and unfair competition," between two law-book publishers, pending the
establishment of liability, explaining that "business competitors in the law book publishing field
are involved as opposing parties, and to allow an extensive discovery into the issue of damages
might result in an unnecessary disclosure of defendant publisher's business affairs to plaintiff
competitor"). To the extent that making bifurcation more routinely available in contract disputes
would be viewed as objectionable because it places a greater burden on the courts, perhaps
requiring the impaneling of two juries, an additional filing fee could be required when a bifurcated
case in fact enters the damages phase.
97. These orders are given pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(7), which provides that a party
may request a protective order to protect trade secrets as well as "confidential research,
development, or commercial information." See generally 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1990) (citing cases dealing with the availability of
"lawyers' eyes only" orders); see also American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co.,
23 F.R.D. 680, 684 (D.R.I. 1959) (compelling defendants to provide answers to interrogatories-
relating to their counterclaims for damages arising from plaintiff's breach of a contract-which
would require them to reveal the names and addresses of their current customers along with the
quantities they each purchased, as well as the names and addresses of their former customers
together with the reasons these customers terminated their contracting relationship with the
defendant, but holding that because "the plaintiff and the defendant are to a certain extent
competitors," access to the answers "should be limited to counsel for the plaintiff and to such
persons as he may engage to assist him in any investigation which he may make in preparation for
trial"); Melori Shoe Corp. v. Pierce & Stevens, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 346, 347 (D. Mass. 1953)
(ordering answers to certain interrogatories to "be disclosed only to counsel for plaintiff and
technical experts assisting in the preparation of plaintiffs case").
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more efficient breach-or-perform incentives in at least a subset of cases in
which secrecy is important. More generally, without going beyond the
bounds of existing doctrine, these orders could be used to at least partially
protect secrecy interests if courts were to explicitly recognize that much of
the financial information needed to establish expectation damages has a
secrecy value to the plaintiff that may be as great as the secrecy value of a
more traditional trade secret, even in contexts in which the parties are not
competitors.9" However, because the lawyers who see the information
subject to these orders may well play a role in subsequent negotiations
between the disputing parties, the use of these orders may only partially
protect a secrecy interest.
E. The Potential Value of Procedural Flexibility
In thinking about whether transactors would value the ability to alter
the mix of monetary recovery and information revelation available under
existing doctrines and adjudicative procedures, it is interesting to note that
in merchant-run private legal systems, where disputes are resolved in trade-
association-run arbitration tribunals that operate under substantive and
procedural rules adopted by the merchants whose transactions they govern,
the substantive rules commonly provide for objective measures of damages,
and wide-ranging party-initiated discovery is not typically permitted.
Instead, parties present the information they are willing to reveal and
arbitrators are given the power both to request more information and to
make adverse inferences about a party who, despite a request, refuses to
provide it.' This suggests, though by no means proves, that transactors
might well benefit from having a choice of a wider array of damage rules
and procedural options than they do under current law. The rules of civil
98. See Louis Weinberg Assocs. v. Monte Christi Corp., 15 F.R.D. 493.495 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(granting, in a contract dispute, a defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to reveal the names of
its customers over the objection that the identity of its customers was a trade secret, explaining
that "[t]here is no absolute privilege which protects such information." particularly since
"[p]laintiff and defendant are not competitors"); see also Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,
340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 1965) (enforcing witness subpoenas over an objection that doing so
would force the witness to "divulge trade secrets," on the grounds that "It]he claimed trade
secrets do not relate to processes, formulas, or methods, but rather to price, cost and volume of
sales .... No absolute privilege protects the information sought here from disclosure in discovery
proceedings."); Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, 60 F.R.D. 587, 589-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (ordering the defendant to answer an interrogatory relating to the identity
and terms on which he dealt with his customers, over his objection that "since plaintiff has
systematically attempted to persuade defendants' customers to switch to plaintiff, to divulge the
terms of the licensing arrangements would enable plaintiff to offer better terms and thereby to take
away these customers," on the grounds that though "[c]ourts have occasionally protected
information relating to business contracts and customer lists, . this material is not absolutely
privileged").
99. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 THE NEv PALGRAVE DICnONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note I, at 108.
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procedure might, for example, be amended to provide for a limited
discovery track that transactors could opt for through inclusion of a contract
provision," which would be another way of at least partially protecting the
secrecy interest in situations where transactors find it desirable to do so."0'
It is important to note, however, that without accompanying substantive
law reform, procedural changes alone cannot adequately protect the secrecy
interest. Even if the rules of procedure permitted transactors to contract
freely as to the amount and type of discovery that could be obtained in the
event of a dispute, the problems created by the existence of secrecy
interests would not be entirely solved. During the course of negotiations
over discovery-limiting contract provisions, transactors would be sending
signals about the type of information they wished to keep private-signals
that might themselves undermine the secrecy interest as much as, or more
than, the negotiations leading up to inclusion of a liquidated-damages
provision. For example, a request to limit access to cost data might well
suggest that this information had a secrecy value. If, however, transactors
could simply contract for an objective measure of damages-particularly a
contract-market based measure-the signal sent would be sufficiently noisy
to protect most of the value of their private information." Thus, the
analysis presented here suggests that, to the extent that secrecy interests are
in fact important to transactors, changes in procedural rules and substantive
law may well be warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
With a view toward refining, rather than challenging, the well-
established literature on the economics of contract damages, this Essay has
identified the breached-against party's secrecy interest as a concern that
ought to be taken into account in the analysis of damage remedies, and
has begun to explore the ways that taking it into account might influence
the analysis of the desirability of various remedial rules. More specifically,
it has suggested that once the information-related effects of the
100. Such approaches are already used in some state courts. Delaware permits contracts
between corporations to include a provision providing that in the event of dispute, discovery will
be limited in time and amount, and a trial will be held in front of two superior court judges and
one chancellor. When certain amount-in-controversy limits are met, the parties may also elect this
procedure at the time the dispute arises. See DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. (Part XV, Interim Rules
Governing Actions Subject to Summary Proceedings for Commercial Disputes).
101. However, greater procedural freedom without substantive law changes will only
partially protect the secrecy interest, because the secrecy interest is jeopardized not only by the
fishing-expedition-type discovery, but also by the revelation of precisely the type of information
needed to establish the magnitude of damages under existing damage measures.
102. The noisiness of the signals sent by a procedure-based opt-out could be increased if the
rules provided a menu of discovery options that transactors would have multiple reasons for
selecting.
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remedy on the aggrieved party's incentive to sue are taken into account,
undercompensatory objective damage measures that do not rely on firm-
specific information may result in more compensation to aggrieved parties
than perfectly compensatory expectation damages that are based on
subjective, firm-specific information.
More generally, identifying the secrecy interest suggests that there is a
real, information-related cost to seeking compensation. The existence of
this cost may help explain why businessmen attach so much importance to
the reputations of their transactional partners even in contexts in which
fully compensatory expectation damages could be easily calculated and
awarded by a court. Because reputation sanctions do not require an
aggrieved party to reveal information about the magnitude of the loss she
suffered, she may have a credible threat to impose them even when she
does not have a credible threat to sue for damages." 3 Their availability may
therefore play a crucial role in regulating the promisor's breach-or-perform
decisions. In a similar vein, the existence of secrecy interests may also
partially account for businessmen's rejection of the Holmesian notion (and,
along with it, the notion of "efficient breach") that a promise in a contract
is nothing more than a promise to perform or to answer in damages for
nonperformance." 4
103. In a companion article, one of us explores in some detail the way that the existence of
strong buyer's-side secrecy interests in transactions between cotton merchants and cotton mills
can explain the preference of the industry's merchant-rn private legal system for hybrid
monetary and reputation-based nonlegal sanctions-more particularly, undercompensatory
market-difference plus fixed-penalty-based monetary damages and strong reputational sanctions.
See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation Through
Rules, Norms and Institutions (draft on file with authors).
104. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 300-01 (Little,. Brown & Co.
1944) (1881).
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